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Abstract. We present an unfolding-based approach to LTL-X model-
checking of high-level Petri nets. It is based on the method proposed by
Esparza and Heljanko for low-level nets [4,5] and a state of the art paral-
lel high-level net unfolder described in [15,13]. We present experimental
results comparing our approach to the one of [4,5] and the model-checker
Spin [12].
1 Introduction
The main drawback of model-checking (see, e.g., [2]) is that it suers from the
state space explosion problem. That is, even a relatively small system specica-
tion can (and often does) yield a very large state space. To alleviate this problem,
a number of techniques have been proposed. They can roughly be classied as
aiming at an implicit compact representation of the full state space of a reactive
concurrent system, or at an explicit generation of a reduced (though sucient
for a given verication task) representation (e.g., abstraction and partial order
reduction techniques [2]). Among them, a prominent technique is McMillan's
(nite prexes of) Petri net unfoldings (see, e.g., [6,16,13,17]). It relies on the
partial order view of concurrent computation, and represents system states im-
plicitly, using an acyclic net. More precisely, given a Petri net , the unfolding
technique aims at building a labelled acyclic net Unf (a prex) satisfying two
key properties [6,16,13]:
{ Completeness. Each reachable marking of  is represented by at least one
`witness', i.e., a marking of Unf reachable from its initial marking. Similarly,
for each possible ring of a transition at any reachable state of  there is a
suitable `witness' event in Unf.
{ Finiteness. The prex is nite and thus can be used as an input to model-
checking algorithms, e.g., those searching for deadlocks.
A nite complete prex satisfying these two properties can be used for model-
checking as a condensed (symbolic) representation of the state space of a system.Indeed, it turns out that often such prexes are exponentially smaller than the
corresponding reachability graphs, especially if the system at hand exhibits a lot
of concurrency. At least, they are never larger than the reachability graphs [6,
16,13].
The unfolding techniques and algorithms described in [6{8,10,13,14,16{18,
20] help to alleviate the state space explosion problem when model-checking
low-level Petri nets. Moreover, the construction of the prex can be eciently
parallelised [11,13]. However, the applicability of these techniques is restricted
by the fact that low-level Petri nets are a very low-level formalism, and thus in-
convenient for practical modelling. Therefore, it is highly desirable to generalise
this technique to more expressive formalisms, such as high-level (or `coloured')
Petri nets. This formalism allows one to model in quite a natural way many con-
structs of high-level specication languages used to describe concurrent systems
(see, e.g., [1]). Though it is possible to translate a high-level net into a low-level
one and then unfold the latter, it is often the case that the intermediate low-level
net is exponentially larger than the resulting prex. Moreover, such a translation
often completely destroys the structure present in the original model. In [15,13],
an approach allowing one to build a prex directly from a high-level net, thus
avoiding a potentially expensive translation into a low-level net, was described.
Experiments demonstrated that this method is often superior to the traditional
one, involving the explicit construction of an intermediate low-level net.
Petri net unfolding prexes have been used for verication of simple safety
properties, such as deadlock freeness, mutual exclusion and various kinds of
reachability analysis [10,13,17,18]. (The LTL model checking algorithm pro-
posed in [22] is quite complicated and a corrected version of the approach re-
quires memory exponential in the size of the prex in the worst case [4,5].)
Recent work [4,5,8] suggested a method for checking LTL-X properties of low-
level Petri nets. It uses a particular non-standard way of synchronising a Petri
net with a B uchi automaton, which preserves as much concurrency as possible,
in order to avoid a blow up in the size of the resulting prex.
In this paper, we build on the ideas of [4,5,11,13,15] and propose a paral-
lel algorithm for verication of LTL-X properties based on high-level Petri net
unfoldings. To our knowledge, no such an algorithm existed before.
2 Basic Notions
We use M-nets [1] as the main high-level Petri net model, as we believe that
it is general enough to cover many other existing relevant formalisms. The full
description of M-nets can be found in [1]; here we give only an informal introduc-
tion, omitting those details which are not directly needed for the purposes of this
paper. In particular, [1] devotes a lot of attention to the composition rules for
M-nets, which are relevant only at the construction stage of an M-net, but not
for model-checking an already constructed one. We assume the reader is familiar
with the standard notions of the Petri nets theory, such as places, transitions,arcs, presets and postsets of places and transitions, marking of a Petri net, the
enabledness and ring of a transition and marking reachability (see, e.g., [6]).
2.1 High-level Petri nets
Let Tok be a (nite or innite) set of elements (or `colours') and VAR be a set
of variable names, such that Tok \VAR = ;. An M-net is a Petri net such that:
{ Each of its places has a type, which is a subset of Tok and indicates the
colours this place can contain. We assume that the types of all places are
nite.1 Valid markings of an M-net can be obtained by placing in each of its
places a (possibly empty) multiset of tokens consistent with the type of the
place.
{ Each transition is labelled by a guard, which is a well-formed Boolean ex-
pression over Tok [ VAR.
{ Each arc is labelled with a multiset of variables from VAR.
For a transition t, we will denote by VAR(t) the set of variables which appear
in its guard and its incident arcs.2
The enabling and ring rules of M-nets are as follows: when tokens ow along
the incoming arcs of a transition t, they become bound to variables labelling
those arcs, forming a (partial) mapping  : VAR(t) ! Tok. If this mapping can
be extended to a total mapping 0 (such an extension can be non-unique) in such
a way that the guard of t evaluates to true and the values of the variables on
the outgoing arcs are consistent with the types of the places these arcs point to,
then t is called enabled and 0 is called a ring mode of t. An enabled transition
can re, consuming the tokens from its preset and producing tokens in places
in its postset, in accordance with the values of the variables on the appropriate
arcs given by 0.
As an example, consider the M-net system shown in Figure 1(a). At the
initial marking, t1 can re with the ring modes 0 df = fv1 7! 1;v2 7! 2;v3 7! 1g
or 00 df = fv1 7! 1;v2 7! 2;v3 7! 2g, consuming the tokens from p1 and p2 and
producing respectively the token 1 or 2 in p3.
2.2 Translation into low-level nets
For each M-net system it is possible to build an `equivalent' low-level one (the
construction is given in [1,15,13]). Such a transformation is called `unfolding'
in [1], but since we use this term in a dierent meaning, we adopt the term
`expansion' instead. One can show that the reachability graphs generated by an
M-net and its expansion are isomorphic, i.e., the expansion faithfully models
the original M-net. This means that LTL properties of high-level nets can be
1 In general, allowing innite types yields a Turing-powerful model. Nevertheless, this
restriction can be omitted in certain important cases [13,15].
2 If some variable appears in the guard of t but not on its incident arcs, it must be
explicitly given a 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Fig.1. An M-net system (a) and its unfolding (b).
veried by building its expansion. However, the disadvantage of this transfor-
mation is that it typically yields a very large net. Moreover, the resulting Petri
net is often unnecessarily large, in the sense that it contains many unreachable
places and many dead transitions. This is so because the place types are usually
overapproximations, and the transitions of the original M-net system may have
many ring modes, only few of which are realised when executing the M-net from
its initial marking. Therefore, though the M-net expansion is a neat theoretical
construction, it is often impractical.
2.3 Petri net unfoldings
The nite complete prex of a low-level Petri net  is a nite acyclic net which
implicitly represents all the reachable states of  together with transitions en-
abled at those states. Intuitively, it can be obtained through unfolding , by
successive rings of transition, under the following assumptions: (a) for each
new ring a fresh transition (called an event) is generated; (b) for each newly
produced token a fresh place (called a condition) is generated. The unfolding is
innite whenever  has at least one innite run; however, if  has nitely many
reachable states then the unfolding eventually starts to repeat itself and can be
truncated without loss of information, yielding a nite and complete prex.
One can show that the number of events in the complete prex can never
exceed the number of reachable states of , for a precise statement see [6,13,16].
However, complete prexes are often exponentially smaller than the correspond-
ing reachability graphs, especially for highly concurrent Petri nets, because they
represent concurrency directly rather than by multidimensional `diamonds' as
it is done in reachability graphs. For example, if the original Petri net consists
of 100 transitions which can re once in parallel, the reachability graph will be
a 100-dimensional hypercube with 2100 nodes, whereas the complete prex will
coincide with the net itself.
In [13,15] unfoldings of high-level Petri nets were dened, and the parallel
unfolding algorithm proposed in [11,13] was generalised to high-level nets. It
turns out that the unfolding of a high-level net is isomorphic to the unfolding ofits low-level expansion. (However, it can be constructed directly from the high-
level net, without building this expansion.) Thus this approach is conservative in
the sense that all the verication tools using traditional unfoldings as input can
be reused with high-level ones. Figure 1(b) shows a nite and complete prex of
the M-net in Figure 1(a), coinciding with the nite and complete prex of the
expansion.
3 An Unfolding Approach to LTL-X Model-Checking
In [4,5], an approach for unfolding based LTL-X model-checking of safe low-
level Petri nets was proposed. It makes use of the automata-theoretic approach
to model-checking [21]. A synchronised net system is constructed as the product
of the original net system and a B uchi automaton accepting the negation of
the property to be checked. Then the model-checking problem is reduced to the
problem of detecting illegal !-traces and illegal livelocks in the synchronised net
system. Both problems are solved by exploiting nite complete prexes of the
unfolded synchronised net system. The main advantage of this approach over
Wallner's [22] is its eciency. Wallner rst calculates a complete nite prex
and then constructs a graph, but the denition of the graph is non-trivial, and
the graph grows exponentially in the size of the prex [4,5]. The approach of
Esparza and Heljanko [4,5] avoids the construction of the graph, but builds a
larger prex.
In this paper we follow the approach of [4,5], but we are using strictly safe
M-nets (i.e., ones which cannot put more than one token in a place) instead of
safe low-level Petri nets. We will explain our approach by means of the example
shown in Figure 2(a) (and in the following denoted by ). It is an M-net model of
a buer which can store at most 2 items (in places p2 and p4). To distinguish these
two items they are represented by coloured tokens 0 and 1. The M-net contains
4 places and 3 transitions whereas its expanded low-level net contains 8 places
and 8 transitions. One can see that if this example is scaled then its expansion
grows exponentially in the size of the buer and the cardinalities of place types,
e.g., if the places have types f0::150g then the expansion contains 604 places and
23103 transitions, whereas the prex of such an M-net has just 10 conditions
and 7 events (in this particular example place types do not inuence the size of
the prex). Thus the prex is often much smaller than the low-level expansion
because the latter can contain many dead transitions and unreachable places
which disappear in the prex. Furthermore, for larger systems the expansion
cannot be constructed within a reasonable time. The main advantage of our
approach over the one of [4,5] is that we unfold the M-net directly and do not
have to build its expansion.
Let us assume that we want to check the property '
df = 32(p2 6= 0),
i.e., \eventually the item 0 is never stored in the buer cell p2 again." First
of all, we have to construct a B uchi automaton accepting :'. This means that
the property ' is violated by a system run in which :(p2 6= 0) is true over and
over again. The corresponding B uchi automaton A:' is shown in Figure 2(b).0
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Fig.2. M-net : buer of capacity 2 (a), B uchi automaton A:' constructed for the
property '
df = 32(p2 6= 0) (b), the M-net corresponding to A:' (c), and the product
net :' (d).
We identify it with an M-net system (also denoted by A:') which has a place
for each state q of the automaton, with only the initial state q0 having a token.
(The type of all its places is fg.) For each transition (q;x;q0) of A:' the M-net
has a transition (q;x;q0), where q and q0 are the input and output places of the
transition, and x is its guard. This M-net is shown in Figure 2(c), and in the
following its places and transitions are called B uchi places and B uchi transitions,
respectively.
In the next step a synchronised M-net system :' is constructed as the prod-
uct of  and A:'. A standard approach would synchronise the system and the
B uchi automaton on all transitions. A drawback of such a synchronisation is that
it completely sequentialises the system. Since a strength of the unfolding tech-
nique is to exploit concurrency, such a product net would not be very suitable for
unfolding based verication techniques. Therefore, we use the synchronisation
construction of [4,5] generalised to high-level nets. In order to exploit concur-
rency,  and A:' are only synchronised on those transitions of  which `touch'
the places that appear in the atomic propositions of '. In the following such
transitions are called visible. For our example this means that  and A:' onlysynchronise on the visible transitions t1 and t2, because they touch the place p2
which is the only place referred to in '.
The resulting product net :' is shown in Figure 2(d). Unlabelled arcs denote
that only  can ow along them.
Construction of :':
1. Put  and A:' side by side.
2. Connect each B uchi transition with  in such a way that it `observes' the
places whose names appear in the guard of the transition. Let (q;x;q0) be
a B uchi transition. For each place p which appears in the guard x add arcs
from p to (q;x;q0) and back; both arcs are labelled with \p". In our example
this rule only applies to I0 because it is the only B uchi transition whose
guard refers to p2. Therefore I0 and p2 are connected by arcs which are
labelled with p2.
3. Add scheduler places B and S (forming a ip-op) in such a way that:
{ initially A:' can make a step, and all the visible transitions of  are
disabled.
{ after a step of A:' only  can make a step.
{ after  has made a visible step, A:' can make a step, and until that all
the visible transitions of  are disabled.
The intuition behind B and S is that A:' (respectively, ) can make a step
if there is a token on B (respectively, S). The types of these places are fg.
B is connected by arcs going from B to every B uchi transition (u0, u1 and
I0), and going from every visible transition (t1 and t2) to B. S is connected
by arcs going from S to every visible transition (t1 and t2), and going from
every B uchi transition (u0, u1 and I0) to S. Only  can ow along the new
arcs. Initially, B contains  and S is empty, which allows A:' to observe the
initial marking of .
Taking a look at the construction of :' so far (see Figure 2(d) without
transitions L0, L1, and L2) it is clear that an innite transition sequence that
touches the accepting B uchi place q1 innitely often violates the property '
because in this case p2 stores 0 over and over again. To detect such system runs
we introduce the set I
df = ft j t contains an accepting place of A:'g of all the
transitions putting a token into an accepting B uchi place.
Now we claim that an innite transition sequence of :' which is reable
from the initial marking and contains innitely many occurrences of I-transitions
violates '. In the following such sequences are called illegal !-traces.
Unfortunately, not every sequence that violates the property ' is detected by
illegal !-traces because we synchronise just on the visible transitions. Consider
a system that contains amongst others a \loop" of invisible transitions. Since
we just synchronise on the visible transitions this \loop" would not take part
in the synchronisation at all. Suppose the system reaches a marking M from
which it is possible to re a loop of invisible transitions. That is, the system
would re an innite sequence of transitions without A:' being able to observeit. Thus one can imagine a scenario where ' is violated but A:' cannot detect
this. Therefore, such a situation must be dealt with separately.
Since the ring of invisible transitions cannot change the marking of the
visible places (i.e., those appearing in the atomic propositions of '), as well as
the places of the scheduler and A:', we simply have to check for each marking
enabling an innite sequence of invisible transitions the existence of an accepting
run of A:' restricted only to those B uchi transitions which are enabled by this
marking. (In such a case ' is violated.)
Formally, we augment the product net :' with a set L of livelock monitors
in such way that a new transition t 2 L i there exists a place q in A:' such that
q 2 t and, starting from q, the A:' accepts an innite sequence of transitions.
Then the situation described above can be formalised by an illegal livelock, which
is an innite ring sequence of the form t0 such that M0
t

 ! M

0
 !, t 2 L
and 0 contains only invisible transitions. A formal description for adding L-
transitions to :' is given in [5].
Theorem 1 (LTL-X Model-Checking of M-nets). Let  be a strictly safe
M-net system whose reachable markings are pairwise incomparable with respect to
set inclusion,3 and ' be an LTL-X formula. It is possible to construct a product
net system :' satisfying the following properties:
{  satises ' i :' has neither illegal !-traces nor illegal livelocks.
{ The input and output places of the invisible transitions are the same in 
and :'.4
From [4,5] we know that the number of L-transitions can grow exponentially
in the size of the M-net system , and so inserting them explicitly into the
product net :' would seriously hamper this approach. Therefore we follow
the trick of [4,5] and generate such transitions on-the-y during the unfolding
procedure. In order to do so we extend the construction of the product net :'
by the following step:
4. For each B uchi transition, add a copy of it with exactly the same guard and
preset, but empty postset. (In our example, these new copies of u0, u1 and
I0 are L0, L1 and L2, respectively.) All these new copies form a subset of
transitions which are candidates to become livelock monitors (L-transitions)
during the unfolding procedure.
The unfolding procedure makes use of these candidates in such a way that
every time when an L-labelled event e could be inserted into the prex it is
checked whether starting from the marking M which is reached by ring e A:'
accepts an innite run. If this is the case then the L-event is inserted into the
prex (otherwise it is not), and its preset is expanded to the whole marking M,
and its postset is a copy of the preset with instances of the visible, scheduler
3 The latter condition is technical and can be removed [5].
4 And thus much concurrency is preserved.and B uchi places removed. This guarantees that from this marking only invisible
transitions can be red in the future.
The check whether A:' can start an accepting run from M restricted to the
B uchi places can be done as follows. Let q be the B uchi place marked under M.
We remove from A:' all the transitions whose guards are evaluated to false
under M (and thus cannot re). Now, in order to check whether there exists an
accepting run of A:' it is enough to search for a strongly connected component
in the obtained graph which is reachable from q and contains at least one I-
transition.
4 Tableaux System
We showed in Section 3 that the model-checking problem for LTL-X can be
reduced to the problem of nding illegal !-traces and illegal livelocks. In [4,5]
these problems are solved by considering the prex as a \distributed" tableaux,
in which the conditions are \facts" and the events represent \inferences", with
the cut-o events being the terminals of the tableaux. We follow this approach,
and informally describe how illegal !-traces and illegal livelocks are detected.
The tableaux T for :' is shown in Figure 3. It contains three terminals,
e15, e16, and e17, but for the moment let us concentrate on e17. Since it is a cut-
o event of the prex, there exists a partially ordered execution (po-execution)
C (C = fe2g in our example) with the same marking fq0;S;p0
1;p1
3g of :' as
the po-execution [e17] = fe1;:::;e8;e12;e14;e17g, where [e] is dened as the
minimal (w.r.t. ) causally closed set of events containing e. Since C  [e17],
the execution [e17]nC = fe1;e3;:::;e8;e12;e14;e17g starts and ends at the same
marking fq0;S;p0
1;p1
3g of :', i.e., it can be repeated arbitrarily many times.
Moreover, it contains an I-event e12, and thus an illegal !-trace 0! is detected,
where 
df = u0 corresponds to C and 0 df = t3t2t3u0t1u0t2I0t1u1 corresponds to
[e17] n C.
The way of detecting illegal livelocks is quite similar, but in this case a
terminal e occurring after an L-event eL is considered. This means that there
exists a po-execution C  [e] (which also contains eL) such that the execution
[e]nC starts and ends at the same marking. Now we can use the same argument
as above to nd an innite trace 0!, but 0 will contain only transitions of :'
corresponding to the events occurring after eL. Since an L-transition empties
the scheduler places of tokens, and they are never put back, no visible or B uchi
transition of :' can be enabled after ring an L-transition. Thus 0 consists
only of invisible transitions, i.e., an illegal livelock is detected. (See [4,5,10] for
more details.)
5 Experimental Results
In this section we present experimental results for the verication of LTL-X prop-
erties. We compare our implementation (in the following denoted by Punf) withb33 q0 b34 S
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Fig.3. The tableaux T for the product net :'. The colours of conditions are not
shown when they are . The ring modes of events are not shown as they can be
derived from their pre- and postsets.(a)
Net Formula Result UnfSmdls Spin Punf
Abp 2(p ! 3q) True 0.19 0.01 0.08
Bds 2(p ! 3q) True 199 0.71 8.47
Dpd(7) 32:(p ^ q ^ r) True 507 2.14 7.25
Furnace(3) 32p True 1057 1.00 26.90
Gasnq(4) 32p True 240 0.14 8.46
Rw(12) 2(p ! 3q) True 2770 0.44 47.67
Ftp 32p True >12000 3.99 836
Over(5) 32p True 66.01 0.44 0.12
Cyclic(12) 2(p ! 3q) True 0.38 11.25 0.08
Ring(9) 32p True 2.13 1.64 0.13
Dp(12) 32:(p ^ q ^ r) True 13.05 117 0.36
Ph(12) 32:(p ^ q ^ r) True 0.04 0.61 0.02
Com(15,0) 2(p ! :3q) True | 3.11 0.02
Par(5,10) 2(p ! :3q) True | 3.60 0.02
Net Spin Punf
Cyclic(15) 168 0.08
Cyclic(16) 478 0.07
Cyclic(17) 1601 0.10
Ring(12) 75.38 0.30
Ring(13) 274 0.50
Ring(14) 1267 0.85
Dp(13) 559 0.53
Dp(14) 2123 0.75
Ph(15) 16.69 0.01
Ph(18) 1570 0.01
Com(20,0) 232 0.02
Com(21,0) 686 0.03
Com(22,0) 2279 0.02
Par(6,10) 161 0.02
Par(7,10) mem 0.04
(b)
Table 1. Experimental results for LTL-X model-checking.
the unfolding based LTL-X model-checker for low-level nets UnfSmodels [5],
and with the model-checker Spin [12]. All experiments are performed on a Linux
PC with a 2.4 GHz Intel(R) Xeon(TM) processor and 4 GB of RAM. All times
are measured in seconds.
We used UnfSmodels version 0.9 of 22nd of October 2003, and invoked it
with the option -l (for LTL-X model-checking).
We used Spin version 4.0.7 of 1st of August 2003, and invoked it with the op-
tions -DMEMCNT=32 (to allow the use of all 4 GB of memory) and -DNOFAIR
(as no fairness assumptions were needed). Spin's partial order reductions were
used in all cases (they are enabled by default).
We used Punf version 7.03 (parallel). In order to have a fair competition
against the other tools we invoked Punf in all examples with the option -N=1
which means that the unfolding procedure is not parallelised, and Punf uses
only one CPU.
The benchmarks (except Ph(n), Com(n;m) and Par(n;m)) are taken from
J.C. Corbett [3]. We used only deadlock-free examples because our semantics for
LTL-X for deadlocking systems is dierent from Spin's semantics and thus the
results would not be comparable. These benchmarks together with the corre-
sponding result les are available at
http://www.fmi.uni-stuttgart.de/szs/people/schroeter/CAV/cav.tgz.
In order to have a fair contest against Spin all systems were modelled in
Promela, all of them (except Ph(n), Com(n;m) and Par(n;m)) by J.C. Cor-
bett [3], but we scaled up some of the benchmarks. The M-nets used as the
input for Punf were automatically derived (using a routine implemented by one
of the authors) from Spin's automata representations of the Promela models.
The low-level nets used as the input for UnfSmodels were obtained from the
M-nets with the help of the hl2ll utility of the Pep tool [9].
Table 1(a) conrms that our approach outperforms UnfSmodels on all ex-
amples, with an increase of speed up to 550 times (Over(5) example). But we
should mention that as noted in [5] UnfSmodels is more or less an academic
prototype, whereas Punf is a high-performance unfolding engine. Com(15,0)
and Par(5,10) could not been veried with UnfSmodels because either theNet Spin Punf(1) Punf(2)
Com(20,3) mem 8.58 6.01
Com(22,3) mem 11.51 8.51
Com(25,3) mem 17.29 12.84
Par(20,100) mem 8.60 4.84
Par(20,150) mem 31.98 18.28
buf(20) | 22.70 16.95
buf(25) | 142.72 89.40
Table 2. Experimental results for the parallel mode.
B uchi automaton corresponding to the LTL-X formula for the low-level net (in
the former case) or the low level net itself (in the latter case) could not be gener-
ated within reasonable time. Comparing Punf and Spin one can see that Spin
performs better on the examples over the line. In contrast, Punf outperforms
Spin on the examples under the line. We wanted to investigate this further and
therefore we scaled up these systems and checked them again.
The results are shown in Table 1(b). They seem to conrm that Spin's ver-
ication time grows exponentially with the size of the benchmark, whereas the
verication time of Punf remains less than a second in all cases. All these sys-
tems have a high degree of concurrency, and the results show that our partial
order technique handles these systems quite well. In contrast, Spin's partial or-
der reductions are not very ecient on these examples. In our current theory this
seems to be related to a reduction condition for LTL-X model-checking which is
known as the reduction proviso (see, e.g., [2,19] for further details).
As it was already mentioned, our unfolding routine supports multiple threads
running in parallel. To demonstrate this we performed some experiments on a
two processor machine.
The results are shown in Table 2. Punf(n) means that Punf makes use of n
processors. The results conrm that the process of LTL-X model checking can
be parallelised quite eciently. This speeds up the verication, in the best case
up to n times. Also the results show that these examples are not veriable with
Spin because it runs out of memory. (We did not verify the Buf(n) system with
Spin because it was modelled directly as an M-net).
6 Conclusions
We have presented an ecient algorithm for verication of LTL-X properties of
high-level Petri nets. We followed an approach proposed by Esparza and Heljanko
in [4,5] for low-level nets, generalised it to M-nets, and implemented it using a
state of the art parallel unfolding engine for high-level nets described in [15,
13]. Finally, we presented results showing that our implementation outperforms
UnfSmodels on all examples, and beats Spin on some examples, mainly those
having a high degree of concurrency. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
rst parallel algorithm for verication of LTL-X properties of high-level Petri
nets based on unfoldings.
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